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Introduction 
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 added the 
Part D prescription drug beneﬁ  t to the Medicare 
program.  This addition, which became eﬀ  ective in 
2006, increased Medicare program costs by more 
than 10 percent in order to provide, for the ﬁ  rst time, 
prescription drug coverage to enrollees.  Part D has 
since enrolled a sizeable share of elders and now pays 
for a large percentage of their prescriptions.  Despite 
the program’s size and importance, however, little is 
known about its eﬀ  ectiveness.  One way to measure 
its success is to determine to what extent it provides 
ﬁ  nancial security to elders.  If Part D covers prescrip-
tion drug spending that was putting older Americans 
at ﬁ  nancial risk, it may result in large social gains.  
If it simply substitutes for – or “crowds out” – exist-
ing insurance arrangements, the social gains may 
be much smaller.  Beyond a crowd-out analysis, a 
full evaluation of Part D also needs to consider other 
social beneﬁ  ts and costs, such as the potential health 
beneﬁ  ts and the eﬃ   ciency costs of subsidizing drug 
coverage.  The study summarized in this brief evalu-
ates Part D’s impact using the 2002-5 and 2007 waves 
of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) before 
and right after the program’s implementation.
The brief is organized as follows.  The ﬁ  rst section 
presents background on Part D.  The second section 
describes the MEPS data.  The third section presents 
the results of Part D’s eﬀ  ect on prescription drug cov-
erage and expenditures and oﬀ  ers a tentative assess-
ment of the program’s overall social impact.  The ﬁ  nal 
section concludes that Part D has resulted in substan-
tial crowd out of both coverage and expenditures and, 
as of 2007, has produced only modest beneﬁ  ts.
Medicare Part D Program
Medicare, which provides universal health insurance 
coverage to people over age 65 and to those on the 
federal Disability Insurance program, was established 
in 1965.  The original program covered most medi-
cal needs for the elderly and disabled, but excluded prescription drug coverage.  However, in the 1990s, 
the advancement of prescription drug treatments for 
common illnesses among the elderly drew attention 
to this coverage gap.  In 2003, the Bush Administra-
tion and Congress agreed on a far-reaching prescrip-
tion drug beneﬁ  t package at a projected cost to the 
federal government of $40 billion per year for its ﬁ  rst 
10 years.1
The resulting beneﬁ  t – known as Medicare Part 
D – is delivered by private insurers under contract 
with the government.  Beneﬁ  ciaries can choose from 
three types of insurance: 1) stand-alone plans, called 
Medicare Prescription Drug Plans, that just oﬀ  er 
prescription drug beneﬁ  ts; 2) Medicare Advantage 
plans, which provide all Medicare beneﬁ  ts (including 
prescription drugs); or 3) the beneﬁ  ciaries’ current 
employer/union plan (for those oﬀ  ered such cover-
age), as long as coverage is at least as generous as the 
standard Part D plan.2
The small literature that has emerged on the 
Medicare Part D program has primarily investigated 
two issues.  The ﬁ  rst is the determinants and eﬃ   cacy 
of decisions to enroll in the program and which plan 
to choose.  The second evaluates the impacts of the 
plan on prescription drug utilization.  Few studies 
address the issue of how Part D has aﬀ  ected ﬁ  nancial 
security.3
The Data
This study uses the 2002-5 and 2007 waves of the 
MEPS, which is comprised of a nationally represen-
tative set of respondents drawn from the National 
Health Interview Survey (NHIS).  The MEPS is a two-
year overlapping panel focused on health insurance 
coverage, health care utilization, and expenditure, 
and is used to construct data for the National Health 
Accounts.  
For each calendar year of the survey, the sample 
is a combination of individuals in their ﬁ  rst year of 
the panel and individuals in their ﬁ  nal year of the 
panel.  Interviews are conducted three times per year.  
The analysis summarized in this brief uses variables 
measured as of the end of each calendar year (i.e., 
from the last interview of the year).  It excludes 2006 
because that was a transition year between private 
coverage and public coverage for many.4
Impact of Part D on Coverage 
and Expenditures
The analysis addresses three separate questions.  
First, did Part D help reduce ﬁ  nancial risk by increas-
ing prescription drug coverage among the elderly?  
Second, did Part D increase total spending on pre-
scription drugs and help ease the spending burden 
on individuals?  Third, considering both beneﬁ  ts and 
costs, what is the initial net social impact of Medicare 
Part D?
Coverage 
The ﬁ  rst step is to examine trends in prescription 
drug insurance coverage for older Americans.  Figure 
1, which compares coverage before and after Part D 
enactment, shows the age proﬁ  le of coverage from 
any source for 50-80 year-olds.  Prior to Part D enact-
ment, coverage rates from any source were constant 
at about 75 percent until age 65, before dropping by 
about 5 percentage points.  After Part D, the age pro-
ﬁ  le is similar through the early 60s before diverging 
sharply at age 65 as coverage rates jump to as high 
as 90 percent.  This shift over only a one- to two-year 
period is remarkable.  
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Figure 1. Prescription Drug Coverage Rates from 
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* “Before” covers 2002-2005 and “after” covers 2007.
Source: Engelhardt and Gruber (2011 forthcoming).Issue in Brief 3
Figure 2 shows how the source of coverage 
changes from private to public by age after Part D 
enactment.5  The public coverage rate in 2007 was less 
than 10 percent for individuals under age 65.  Public 
coverage then jumps dramatically to 70 percent or 
more for those 65 and older.  This age-related in-
crease in public coverage is much larger than the total 
increase in insurance coverage (as shown in Figure 1, 
a gap between the before-and-after lines of roughly 15 
percentage points), suggesting signiﬁ  cant crowd out 
of existing coverage by the Part D expansion.
Figure 2. Percentage of Individuals Ages 50-80 
with Public Prescription Drug Coverage After 
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To conﬁ  rm that other factors that could aﬀ  ect 
drug coverage during this period are not responsible 
for the apparent crowd out, regression analysis is 
required.  The analysis summarized here compares 
prescription drug coverage and utilization between 
the near-elderly (ages 60-64) and the elderly (age 65 
and over).  The results are similar across numerous 
speciﬁ  cations, including deﬁ  ning near elderly as ages 
50-64, deﬁ  ning elderly as ages 65-70, and controlling 
for demographics, region, health status, and income.6  
The estimates show a very large increase in 
prescription drug coverage from 2002-05 to 2007 for 
those individuals age 65 and over with only a moder-
ate corresponding increase for 60-64-year-olds.  Over-
all, Part D was associated with a 12.3-percentage-point 
rise in prescription drug coverage among the elderly.  
The corresponding calculation for public coverage 
shows a rise of 40.8 percentage points in public cover-
age for those individuals age 65 and over.  Putting the 
two estimates together (12.3/40.8) implies very large 
crowd out of 70 percent, which means that the vast 
majority of those who signed up for Part D moved 
over from another source of coverage (see Figure 3).7
Figure 3. Estimate of the Crowd-Out Effect of 
Public Prescription Drug Coverage of the 





Source: Engelhardt and Gruber (2011 forthcoming). 
Expenditures
The next step is to examine the impact of Part D on 
prescription drug spending, which is interesting for 
two reasons.  First, it extends the crowd-out analy-
sis to look more speciﬁ  cally at the dollar reduction 
in spending covered by private insurance relative to 
the dollar increase in public spending.  Second, using 
the spending data allows for a direct assessment of 
the extent to which public insurance increased the 
ﬁ  nancial protection of the elderly through reduced 
out-of-pocket costs.
The study again turns to regression analysis to 
estimate how changes in public prescription drug 
spending for the elderly inﬂ  uence changes in total 
drug spending.  The resulting estimates indicate that 
Part D crowds out substantial spending by both pri-
vate insurers and individuals (see Figure 4 on the next 
page).  Private insurance spending falls by more than 
42 cents for every dollar increase in public spending.  
Out-of-pocket spending by the elderly falls by about 
34 cents per public dollar spent.8  Thus, the estimates 
suggest that each dollar of public expenditure raises Center for Retirement Research 4
Figure 4. Estimate of the Crowd-Out Effect of 
Public Prescription Drug Spending of the 
Elderly, Age 65 and Over
New public  Reduced private 




Source: Engelhardt and Gruber (2011 forthcoming). 
total expenditure by 25 cents, or that there is about 75 
percent crowd out.  This result is strikingly similar to 
the coverage crowd-out estimate above.
Despite the large crowd-out estimate, Part D may 
still provide valuable risk protection to the elderly.  
However, a closer examination of the data shows that 
– for the median participant – Part D is associated 
with a reduction in only $180 in out-of-pocket spend-
ing.  For those with very high out-of-pocket spending 
– the 90th percentile – the reduction is $800.  To put 
these numbers into context, the baseline value for 
out-of-pocket spending is $2,500.
Overall Social Impact of Part D
While the regression results indicate a very high 
degree of crowd out for both participation and expen-
ditures, a full evaluation of the program requires a 
broad assessment of its net social beneﬁ  ts.  On the 
beneﬁ  t side, as noted in the previous section, Part D 
could help beneﬁ  ciaries by reducing the risk associ-
ated with prescription drug spending.  It could also, 
perhaps, reduce spending needs on health care ser-
vices other than prescription drugs.  On the cost side, 
Part D – like any tax-funded program – involves a loss 
in economic eﬃ   ciency from redirecting resources 
from the private market to a public activity.  Another 
cost is the potential moral hazard associated with 
the program; as drugs become relatively cheaper for 
individuals, they could be less careful with how much 
they consume so that they end up spending more on 
drugs that may not oﬀ  er compelling health beneﬁ  ts.  
While calculating the costs and beneﬁ  ts is diﬃ   cult 
and requires many simplifying assumptions, this 
study’s ﬁ  ndings, which are detailed in the full paper, 
suggest that both the potential direct gains and the 
costs are relatively modest.9
Conclusion
This study ﬁ  nds that the introduction of Medicare 
Part D is associated with substantial crowd out of 
both prescription drug coverage and expenditures.  
An initial assessment of the broader social impact of 
the program suggests that both its beneﬁ  ts and costs 
are modest.  However, a comprehensive evaluation of 
the program requires further research, including an 
analysis of whether Part D is associated with gains in 
health that would both improve individuals’ quality of 
life and potentially lower health spending on non-
prescription drug services.Issue in Brief 5
Endnotes
1  Congressional Budget Oﬃ   ce (2002).
2  In this case, the plan sponsor would receive a 
Retiree Drug Subsidy from the government.  
3  Two studies that do address this issue are Lichten-
berg and Sun (2007); and Levy and Weir (2009). 
4  For a full discussion of the speciﬁ  c MEPS data used 
in this analysis, see Engelhardt and Gruber (2011 
forthcoming).
5  “Public” means either through Medicare or Med-
icaid.  The deﬁ  nition of public coverage and expen-
diture used in this study includes two important 
caveats.  The ﬁ  rst is how to classify prescription drug 
coverage through Medicare HMOs.  Before the imple-
mentation of Part D in 2006, many, but not all, indi-
viduals who were enrolled in Medicare HMO plans 
received prescription drug coverage, which actually 
was a mix of private and public coverage.  This study 
classiﬁ  es Medicare HMOs as private in the pre-period 
and public in the post-period.  The second is that 
the Medicare Modernization Act that created Part D 
gives subsidies to employers/unions to keep coverage 
under the Retiree Drug Subsidy program.  Therefore, 
some government-funded insurance will be classiﬁ  ed 
as “private” coverage under the deﬁ  nition used in this 
study.
6  See the full paper for details (Engelhardt and 
Gruber, 2011 forthcoming).
7  If coverage through a Medicare HMO prior to 
2006 is treated as public coverage in the pre-period, 
then the estimate of the crowd-out eﬀ  ect drops to 70 
percent.
8  The results also showed that there is little change 
in the odds that individuals ﬁ  ll a prescription.  On 
the other hand, the number of prescriptions ﬁ  lled per 
enrollee went up astronomically, by four prescriptions 
per new enrollee, or 14 percent of the pre-period aver-
age for those over age 65.
9  These ﬁ  ndings are subject to a number of caveats.  
On the one hand, these welfare calculations may 
overstate the gains from Part D if other consumption-
smoothing mechanisms are available to the elderly, 
such as private income transfers, own savings, or 
uncompensated medical care.  On the other hand, the 
gains from Part D may be understated because the 
calculations were based on an annual, rather than a 
lifetime, measure of expenditure risk.  In particular, 
there is some evidence that lifetime medical spending 
risk is greater than annual risk, because out-of-pocket 
expenditures are highly persistent over time (see 
Feenberg and Skinner, 1994; and French and Jones, 
2004).  Finally, the welfare calculations were predi-
cated on the assumption that individuals do not value 
any improvements in health associated with increased 
prescription drug spending.  To the extent that Part D 
is associated with health gains and they are valued, the 
estimates will understate the true gains from Part D. Center for Retirement Research 6
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